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BEYOND THE CLASH OF DISPARITIES:
COCAINE SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER
JACOB LOSHlN*

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court invalidated the
federal Sentencing Guidelines and, with the stroke of a pen, unset
tled more than two decades of established sentencing practice. l
Booker held that the highly detailed Sentencing Guidelines would
now be merely "advisory" rather than mandatory,2 and that judges
would now have discretion to impose sentences subject only to the
constraint that the sentences be "reasonable."3 Some recoiled at
this apparent nod to judicial discretion. Others welcomed it as a
chance to rethink a system that had not lived up to expectations.
But all saw it as a major source of conceptual, doctrinal, and practi
cal disorder. As one judge trenchantly remarked, Booker "abruptly
disengaged the most thorough and carefully considered regime of
criminal sentencing in history and ... substituted a two-word re

* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2007. Thanks to Kate Stith and Nina Good
man for their help and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. [d. at 246 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
3. [d. at 261.
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gime of criminal sentencing (perhaps the most abbreviated in his
tory)-the regime of the 'reasonable sentence.'''4
Shortly after Booker, this most ambiguous and abbreviated re
gime of criminal sentencing collided with one of the most contro
versial and prolonged substantive issues in criminal sentencing: the
disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences. Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, drug sentences vary based on the quantity
of drugs possessed, and possession of just one gram of crack cocaine
is punished as harshly as possession of 100 grams of powder co
caine. s Known as the "100:1 ratio," this disparity between crack
and powder sentences has earned strident criticism and fomented
much controversy over the past decade. 6 Many observers consider
the ratio to be irrational and unfair, inflicting a disparate impact on
African-Americans, who tend to be far more likely to receive crack
convictions than powder convictions. Indeed, much of this criticism
has come from sentencing judges themselves.7 Yet, prior to
Booker, judges could do very little about it. The Sentencing Guide
lines were mandatory, and all constitutional challenges to the 100:1
ratio failed. 8 In the wake of Booker, however, the issue has
reemerged as sentencing judges begin to use their newfound discre
tion to undermine the 100:1 ratio.9 Many judges have cited their
disapproval of the ratio as a reason for imposing shorter sentences
than those recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, and appel
late courts must now struggle with the question of whether such
sentences satisfy Booker's standard of "reasonableness."l0
This Article examines the crack-powder ratio in light of
Booker's transformation of federal sentencing. Specifically, it con
siders the degree to which sentencing judges must continue to abide
by the 100:1 ratio advised by the Sentencing Guidelines. In doing
4. United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364-65 (M.D. Fla.
2006).
5. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1(C)(1l) (2006).
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
9. To my knowledge, this reemergence has not yet been addressed in the schol
arly literature. The popular press and legal advocacy groups, however, have given it
much attention. See, e.g., Gary Fields, Judges Show More Lenience on Crack Cocaine,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12,2006, at 2A; see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union,
ACLU and Sentencing Experts Renew Call for Federal Courts to Uphold Judges' Right
to Reject loo-to-l CrackIPowder Sentencing Disparity (May 18, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.orgldrugpolicy/sentencing/25604prs20060518.html.
10. See infra Parts II.B.l (discussing judicial approval) and III.C (discussing ap
pellate approaches).
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so, this Article approaches the debate in three different ways-one
conceptual, one doctrinal, and one practical-and it attempts to
weave these strands into an argument for moderation.
Conceptually, this Article distinguishes between two different
and underappreciated ways of thinking about Booker's sentencing
doctrine. The first approach, which I shall call "substantive reason
ableness," seeks to identify the best sentence measured by generally
accepted purposes of punishment. 11 The second approach, which I
shall call "structural reasonableness," does not seek to identify the
substantively "correct" sentence; rather, it asks who is in the best
position to decide particular questions related to sentencing. Sub
stantive reasonableness has been the dominant mode of post
Booker analysis. However, this Article contends that it cannot re
solve the issue of the crack-powder ratio, since the substantive cri
teria Booker requires courts to consider result in irresolvable
analytical gridlock. Hence, structural reasonableness offers a more
promising approach. This Article seeks to flesh out this under-the
orized structural alternative and use it to resolve the crack-powder
issue.
Doctrinally, this Article argues that sentencing judges should
not categorically reject the 100:1 Guidelines ratio, as some have
been inclined to do. Instead, structural reasonableness demands a
more nuanced division of responsibilities: Individualized decisions
about a particular offender ought to be made by the sentencing
judges who know offenders best and who are better able to make
fact-intensive distinctions; in contrast, policy decisions-such as
drug quantity ratios-that affect large classes of offenders or the
relative relationship between offenses ought to be made by the leg
islative branch. Finally, appellate courts should police the bounda
ries between individualized and policy-based sentencing rationales
through a two-tiered scrutiny regime.
Practically, this Article argues that the structural approach of
fers the most fair and flexible judicial solution to what has been an
intractable and contentious dispute over cocaine sentencing. The
best arguments against the 100:1 ratio are individualized in nature.
Hence, within reason, judges should rely on such individualized fac
tors to justify below-Guidelines sentences. Judges should exercise
their Booker discretion by being more lenient in particular situa
11. The Court held in Booker that such decisions should be guided by the princi
ples of sentencing outlined in 18 U.s.c. § 3553(a). United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 261 (2005).
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tions where the Guidelines are too harsh. However, to the extent
judges rely on generalized rationales that affect every crack defen
dant regardless of circumstances, they tread on decisions more
properly made by Congress. Hence, the structural distinction be
tween individualized and policy-based rationales achieves a balance
between these objectives, limiting unfair consequences of the 100:1
ratio without overstepping judicial bounds.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I surveys the post
Booker sentencing scene, explaining the new doctrinal framework
and exploring empirical data that reveal Booker's impact on co
caine sentencing. Part II considers the substantive approach to co
caine sentencing. It offers a short history of the cocaine sentencing
controversy and argues that the controversy cannot be resolved on
substantive grounds. Part III outlines the structural alternative and
argues that it offers a better solution. This part seeks to flesh out
the distinction between individualized and policy-based sentencing
rationales, and it sketches a proposed structural regime. Part IV
offers some examples of how the structural approach works in
practice.
I.

A.

THE POST-BOOKER LANDSCAPE

Booker's Doctrine

The current federal sentencing regime constitutes the third act
of a drama that spans the past half-century. The first act, which
began in America's early days but reached its crescendo during the
1960s and 1970s, relied on a rehabilitative ideal of sentencing that
granted sentencing judges nearly unrestrained authority to tailor
appropriate sentencesJ2 However, by the 1970s, this discretionary
regime came under vigorous attack. Critics argued that the discre
tionary system produced arbitrary and inconsistent outcomes, re
sulting in undue disparity between the sentences of offenders
convicted of similar crimes.13
Hence, in 1984, Congress reacted to this lack of confidence in
judicial discretion by passing the Sentencing Reform Act,14 thereby
12. For a concise history of early federal criminal sentencing in the United States,
see KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-37 (1998).
13. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973) (providing an influential critique).
14. The Sentencing Reform Act became part of the Comprehensive Crime Con
trol Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (codified as amended in scat
tered sections of 18 U.S.c. (2000».
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opening the second act in our federal sentencing drama. The Sen
tencing Reform Act created the independent United States Sen
tencing Commission and delegated authority to the Commissi.:>n to
establish a set of mandatory guidelines for determining criminal
sentences. IS The resulting Sentencing Guidelines dictated federal
criminal sentences with a high degree of specificity, leaving little
room for judges to exercise their own judgment in sentencing.
Under the Guidelines, sentence lengths were calculated using a
complex formula that integrated the offender's underlying crime,
specific attributes of the crime, other relevant attributes, and the
offender's criminal history. For each category of crime, the Guide
lines dictated a Base Offense Level, which was then adjusted to ac
count for "specific offense characteristics" indicative of the severity
of the offense. In drug cases, the most important characteristic de
termining sentence length was quantity.16 For example, a defen
dant convicted of possession with intent to distribute five grams of
crack would have received a Base Offense Level of twenty-sixP
The level would have then been increased or decreased based on
other "relevant conduct" and "offense adjustments" associated with
the crime, such as other crimes committed, the vulnerability of the
victim, or the defendant's acceptance of responsibility. Finally, the
defendant's Criminal History Category would have been computed,
based on the number and severity of prior offenses. The final Of
fense Level and Criminal History Category calculations would then
have been plotted on a matrix that dictated the offender's sentence
in the form of a range, indicating a minimum and maximum sen
tence length. Is In our example, if the offender had no criminal his
tory and no offense adjustments, the guidelines would require a
sentence of sixty-three to seventy-eight months.
This algorithmic approach to sentencing left little room for ju
dicial discretion. Judges could choose within the narrow range
15. 28 U.S.c. § 991 (2000). The Commission's Guidelines become binding six
months after official promulgation, unless Congress votes to disapprove them. See 28
U.S.c. § 994(p) (2000); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (uphold
ing the constitutionality of Congress's delegation to the Commission).
16. Quantity factors are easy to measure objectively, but critics have questioned
whether the Guidelines' strong reliance on quantity appropriately captures the degree
of culpability and harm associated with a given crime. See STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 12, at 69-70. In the case of drug crimes, quantity of drugs possessed is an imperfect
proxy for an offender's role in a drug-dealing operation. The kingpin may get caught
with the "mother lode," or he may not. The focus on quantity trades a flexible, subjec
tive judgment for an imperfect, objective proxy.
17. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2Dl.l.
18.

[d. § SA.
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computed from the Guidelines, and they could also "depart" from
the Guidelines' range in cases where the defendant's offense dif
fered substantially from the "heartland" case envisioned by the
Guidelines. 19 However, the Guidelines closely circumscribed per
missible reasons for such departures. 2o Moreover, statutory
mandatory minimums further constrained discretion by creating ab
solute sentencing floors for certain offenses, which judges could not
easily avoid.
In 2005, the Supreme Court opened the third act of our sen
tencing drama with United States v. Booker.21 In a five to four deci
sion, the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury insofar as they increased
defendants' sentences on the basis of facts not found by a jury.22
However, instead of invalidating the Sentencing Reform Act or re
quiring juries to decide all sentencing-related factual issues, a sepa
rate five to four majority held that the Guidelines could be saved
from constitutional error through a small (but consequential) judi
cial revision of the statute-specifically, a transformation of the
Guidelines from mandatory to "advisory."23 If the Guidelines are
no longer binding on judges, the jury right does not attach to sen
tencing-related fact finding. Or so the Court reasoned. 24 Of
19. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996), superseded by statute, PRO
TECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(a), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).
20. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, §§ 5K2.1O-2.13,
2.16. As Stith and Cabranes have observed, the Guidelines' grounds for downward
departure are limited to "situations in which the substantive criminal law recognizes a
partial or full defense to a crime." STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 74. Many
other rationales for downward departure-including a defendant's "minor role in a
crime, diminished mental capacity ... age, health, [and] familial responsibility"-had
been rejected by appellate courts. [d. at 100. The most common ground for downward
departure is the finding that a defendant has provided "substantial assistance" to prose
cutors. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5K1.1.
Departure discretion was also further constrained in 2003, when Congress overturned
Koon's abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review of sentences and replaced it
with a de novo standard. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(a), 117 Stat.
650.
21. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). More precisely, this act began a
year earlier with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which invalidated Wash
ington's state sentencing guidelines. Booker applied Blakely's logic, inevitably, to the
federal Guidelines.
22. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243-44 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
23. Id. at 245 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
24. One might charitably describe the Court's logic as opaque. Nevertheless, the
merits of the Booker decision lie beyond the scope of this Article. Here, we are more
concerned with Booker's consequences. For a short critique of the logic behind
Booker's remedial holding, see Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U.
L. REV. 665, 677-80 (2006).
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course, the instruction that judges treat the Guidelines as "advi
sory" does little to clarify how the Guidelines should advise.
Hence, the Court further instructed that appellate courts should re
view sentences for "reasonableness,"25 and that such determina
tions should be guided by the broad purposes of sentencing
outlined in § 3553(a) of the federal sentencing statute. 26
At least on paper, this third act of our sentencing drama ap
pears to herald a rebirth of judicial discretion. The Guidelines are
no longer mandatory, and judges are more free to fashion punish
ments they deem to be reasonable. Yet, this new emancipatory
doctrine of "reasonableness" remains in complex, perhaps schizo
phrenic, tension with the advisory nature of the Guidelines. In
deed, Booker has spawned many questions yet to be worked out:
What does it mean for the Guidelines to be "advisory"? Upon
which factors should sentencing judges rely? What does appellate
"reasonableness" review entail? And finally, in this new sentencing
regime, what is the proper balance between legislative control, ad
ministrative expertise, appellate oversight, and judicial discretion?
To these questions, Booker gives few answers. Hence, in the wake
of Booker, the "advisory" Guidelines, "reasonableness" review,
and § 3553(a) converge into what can best be considered a nascent
common law of sentencing. Naturally, the courts are now straining
to fashion rules to govern this new sentencing regime-to distill
Booker's vague aspirations into concrete reality.
B.

Booker's Results

Before pondering the emerging post-Booker rules more fully,
let us take a brief detour to examine Booker's early results. One
may reasonably question whether Booker's transformation of fed
eral sentencing doctrine has translated into any real changes in sen
tencing outcomes on the ground. Yet, with respect to crack and
cocaine sentencing, Booker does appear to have had an impact. In
deed, the impact of Booker has been felt more noticeably in crack
sentencing than in other areas.
The Sentencing Commission's March 2006 report on the im
pact of Booker provides the latest comprehensive data on post

25.
26.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 263 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
18 U.S.c. § 3553(a) (2000).
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Booker sentencing trends.27 Based on analysis of all sentences is
sued in the year following Booker, the Commission reported that
judges issued non-government-sponsored,28 below-Guidelines
sentences in 12.5 percent of cases and above-Guidelines sentences
in 1.6 percent of cases. 29 This represents a significant increase in
non-Guidelines sentencing compared to the period directly preced
ing Booker. In the year prior to Booker, judges were able to depart
from the Guidelines in extraordinary cases,3° but they used this au
thority to issue below-Guidelines sentences in only 5.8 percent of
cases31 and above-Guidelines sentences in 0.8 percent of cases. 32
Of course, these numbers suggest something far short of a revolu
tion, but they are not insignificant either. Booker has more than
doubled the percentage of cases in which judges are using their dis
cretion to issue sentences not advised by the Guidelines.
Most importantly for the issue at hand, the post-Booker expan
sion in judicial discretion has had even more marked consequences
in the area of crack sentencing. The Commission's report observes
that post-Booker crack sentencing trends are "consistent with those
of the other major drug types,"33 and it concludes that "[c]ourts do
not often appear to be using Booker ... to impose below-range
sentences in crack cocaine cases."34 However, the Commission's
conclusion paints with too broad a brush. According to the Com
mission's own data, the percentage of crack cases in which judges
have given non-government sponsored below-Guidelines sentences
has increased from 4.3 percent before Booker to 14.7 percent after
27.

U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED
ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 62 (2006) [hereinafter BOOKER RE
PORT], available at http://www.ussc.govlbooker_reportIBookecReport.pdf.
28. I have chosen to leave out government-sponsored § 5K1.1 substantial assis
tance departures. These are not directly relevant to the issue at hand, since below
Guidelines sentences in these cases are more a function of prosecutorial discretion than
judicial discretion. Here, we are concerned only with Booker's impact on judges' sen
tencing behavior, not on the behavior of prosecutors.
29. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 62.
30. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
31. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 57 (noting a 6.7 percentage point
increase since Booker).
32. See id. at 58.
33. Id. at 126.
34. Id. at 111. Activists with a stake in preventing congressional overreaction
have also downplayed the impact of Booker. See Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, Sen
tencing with Discretion: Crack Cocaine Sentencing After Booker, THE SENTENCING PRO
JECT 7 (2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.orglpdfs/crackcocaine-after
booker.pdf ("These trends do not suggest a seismic shift in federal sentencing, and seem
more illustrative of 'business as usual. "').
STATES V. BOOKER

2007]

BEYOND THE CLASH OF DISPARITIES

627

Booker.35 The percentage of such sentences in powder cocaine
cases has also increased from 4.2 percent before Booker to 10.8 per
cent after Booker.36 Notably, in exercising their Booker discretion,
judges seem to be somewhat more likely to give below-Guidelines
sentences in crack cases than in powder cases. Before Booker,
downward departure rates for crack and powder offenses were
roughly identical (4.2 percent and 4.3 percent, respectively);37 after
Booker, judges appear to be giving below-Guidelines sentences at a
rate four percentage points higher in crack cases than in powder
cases (14.7 percent and 10.8 percent).38 This is undoubtedly a
curious development, and one that has gone unnoticed by the Com
mission. Hence, although the percentage of below-Guidelines
sentences has increased overall, it has increased more so for crack
defendants, and judges are more likely to give below-Guidelines
sentences to crack defendants than to powder defendants. This is a
new phenomenon that has emerged in the wake of Booker.
Since Booker, judges have issued below-Guidelines sentences
in 610 crack cases,39 and most of these sentences have been based
on individualized sentencing rationales. 40 However, judges in a sig
nificant number of cases have cited their disagreements with the
100:1 ratio as a reason to give below-Guidelines sentences. Judges
have done so in at least thirty-five cases,41 and ten of these judges
have issued published opinions justifying their decisions. 42 In these
35. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 126-28.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 128 tb1.20; infra fig.1.
38. See Figs. 1 & 2.
39. BOOKER REpORT, supra note 27, at 130.
40. See id. at 82 (listing various rationales that have been cited by judges).
41. Id. at 131. In an additional seventy-three cases, the crack-powder disparity
may have been a factor, but the sentencing courts' references to "disparity" were too
vague to know for sure. Id. Since there have been a total of 5,112 crack cases since
Booker, this amounts to between 0.7 percent and 2.1 percent of all crack cases. Id. at
128.
42. United States v. Hamilton, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (reduced
from 70-87 months to 36 months); United States v. Stukes, No.3 CR. 601 (RWS), 2005
WL 2560244 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12,2005) (20:1; reduced from 46-57 months to 33 months);
United States v. Fisher, 451 F. Supp. 2d 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (10:1; reduced from 295
353 months to 211 months); United States v. Castillo, No.3 CR. 835 (RWS), 2005 WL
1214280 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2005) (20:1; reduced from 135-168 months to 87 months)
(government's appeal to Second Circuit pending); United States v. Clay, No. 2:03CR73,
2005 WL 1076243 (E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2005) (no explicit ratio; reduced from 235-293
months to 156 months); United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (no explicit ratio; reduced from 360 months-life to 204 months); Simon v. United
States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (10:1 or 20:1; reduced from 324-405 months
to 262 months); United States v. Harris, No. 04-0157 (JR), 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3958
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ten cases with published opinions, judges have generally chosen to
replace the 100:1 ratio with their own 20:1 or 10:1 ratios when calcu
lating sentences. This has resulted in an average sentence reduction
of thirty-five percent below the minimum sentence advised by the
Guidelines. 43 In contrast, other judges have disagreed, refusing to
impose a below-Guidelines sentence based on the 100:1 ratio.44
Moreover, eight circuits have also weighed in. Two have permitted
judges to abandon the ratio,45 while six have overturned district
judges' decisions to impose below-Guidelines sentences based on
categorical rejection of the 100:1 ratio.46 In sum, a growing differ
ence of opinion is emerging in the district and circuit courts over
the 100:1 ratio, but the issue still remains in its infancy.

II.

COCAINE SENTENCING AND THE CLASH OF DISPARITIES

The preceding discussion has provided a snapshot of the doctri
nal and practical changes Booker has wrought. Booker has given
judges a measure of freedom from the constraints of the Sentencing
Guidelines, yet this new authority remains precarious and perhaps
even illusory. The contours of the new sentencing regime will de
pend on how the courts come to understand Booker's standard of
"reasonableness." Nevertheless, judges do appear to be using their
(D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2005); United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
(20:1 ratio; reduced from 41-51 months to 18 months); see also United States v. Nellum,
No. 2:04-CR-30-PS, 2005 WL 300073 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2005) (citing unfairness of ratio,
but justifying lower sentence based on unrelated individualized factors) (no explicit ra
tio; reduced from 168-210 months to 108 months).
43. Note that statutory mandatory minimums create a floor below which judges
cannot reach. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 412 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2006); United
States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Neb. 2005).
45. United States v. Pickett, 2007 WL 445937 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v.
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006).
46. See United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Jointer, 457 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir.
2006); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Pho, 433
F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 2006). Addition
ally, three circuits have refused to find the ratio presumptively unreasonable. See
United States v. Esperance, 165 Fed. App'x 814 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United
States v. Lister, 432 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cawthorn, 429 F.3d 793
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United
States v. Thomas, 158 Fed. App'x 623 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (pre-Booker sen
tence does not constitute plain error, since alleged unfairness of the crack sentencing
ratio is insufficient reason to believe district court would have imposed a lower sentence
post-Booker). This follows a general trend in which many circuits have concluded that
within-Guidelines sentences should be accorded a presumption of reasonableness.
BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 27 (collecting cases).
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new discretion in the context of cocaine sentencing, and this has
resulted in more below-Guidelines sentences in crack cases than in
powder cases. Many of these judges have based their below-Guide
lines crack sentences on individualized sentencing rationales. Nev
ertheless, a significant group of others have explicitly issued below
Guidelines sentences for the primary reason that they disagree with
the 100:1 Guidelines ratio.
This Part will examine the debate over the 100:1 ratio more
closely, providing a brief history of cocaine sentencing policy and
discussing the main objections to the 100:1 ratio. It will then discuss
how many judges have treated the 100:1 ratio in the wake of
Booker, and how their "substantive reasonableness" approach fails
to resolve the issue.
A.

The Cocaine Controversy

The crack-powder sentencing disparity has been controversial
since crack first materialized. While cocaine had been present in
America since the turn of the century, crack emerged in the late
1970s and spread rapidly to America's major cities by the early
1980s.47 Crack is a form of cocaine typically made by dissolving
powder cocaine in water, adding baking soda, and then heating and
drying the mixture until it forms small crystals. 48 The user smokes
these crystals and inhales the evaporating fumes in a manner that
most quickly and efficiently delivers cocaine to the brain. Crack
produces a short, intense feeling of euphoria that is highly
addictive. 49
Due to its addictiveness and low price, crack use skyrocketed
in the 1980s, and inner-city gangs fought turf wars for control over
lucrative crack distribution networks. 50 Hence, responding to pub
lic outcry over what had come to be perceived as a "crack epi
demic," Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 51 The
Act established harsh mandatory minimum sentences for serious
drug offenders, and in so doing, it enshrined in statute a "100:1"
47. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 32, 36 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 REPORT], available
at hup:llwww.ussc.gov/crack/chap1-4.pdf.
48. Id. at 14. By this method, one gram of powder cocaine will produce approxi
mately 0.89 grams of crack. Id.
49. See William Spade, Jr., Beyond the JOO:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine
Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1260 (1996).
50. Id. at 1243-44.
51. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codi
fied at 21 U.S.c. § 841(a) (2000)).
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sentencing ratio for cocaine offenses. The resulting mandatory
minimum scheme tied sentence length to drug quantity and treated
offenses involving one gram of crack cocaine as severely as one
hundred grams of powder cocaine. 52 When the Sentencing Com
mission created its first set of Guidelines the following year, it al
igned cocaine sentences with the drug quantity ratio established in
Congress's mandatory minimums. 53
The sentencing differential between crack and powder cocaine
was justified on a variety of grounds, including crack's greater ad
dictiveness, its association with other serious crimes, its low price
and ease of manufacture, and its harsher physiological effects.54
But the sentencing ratio soon came under fire. Critics argued that
it unduly targeted low-level dealers, that there is little pharmacolog
ical difference between crack and powder cocaine, and that the ra
tio had a disparate impact on African-Americans. 55 Defendants
challenged the cocaine ratio in the courts on equal protection
grounds, but no appellate court was willing to strike it down.56
However, in response to public criticism, Congress asked the
Sentencing Commission to investigate the crack-powder ratio and
propose possible modifications. 57 In 1995, the Commission issued
its report concluding that although "crack cocaine poses greater
harms to society than does powder cocaine" and thus "may warrant
higher penalties," the specific 100:1 quantity ratio "should be re
examined and revised. "58 Although the report did not propose a
different quantity ratio, the Commission proposed amended Guide
52. Under the two-tiered mandatory minimum scheme, trafficking in five to forty
nine grams of crack, or 500 to 4,999 grams of powder cocaine, results in a five-year
mandatory minimum sentence; trafficking in fifty or more grams of crack, or 5,000 or
more grams of powder cocaine, results in a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. 21
U.S.c. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) to (iii), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) to (iii).
53. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2D1.1 cmt. (not
ing need to coordinate sentencing guidelines with mandatory minimums).
54. See 1995 REpORT, supra note 47, at 117-18.
55. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1283, 1288-99 (1995); Spade, supra note 49, at 1266-68.
56. See United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 733 (1st Cir. 1994); United
States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464,464 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 92
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 96 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 64 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gaines, 122 F.3d 324, 329
(6th Cir. 1997) (citing cases); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 751 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 710 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dumas,
64 F.3d 1427, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995).
57. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103
322, § 280006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097 (1994).
58. 1995 REpORT, supra note 47, at xiii, 195, 197.

2007]

BEYOND THE CLASH OF DISPARITIES

631

lines three months later that would have created identical sentences
for crack and powder offenses. 59 After holding hearings, however,
Congress rejected the Commission's proposal and directed the
Commission to recommend further alternatives to the 100:1 ratio
that would punish crack offenses more severely than powder of
fenses. 6o In 1997, the Sentencing Commission issued a new report
recommending that the ratio be reduced by simultaneously raising
the crack quantity threshold and lowering the cocaine quantity
threshold such that the result would be a 5:1 ratio. 61 This touched
off a flurry of proposals in Congress with a variety of ratios. Ulti
mately, however, Congress could not find a consensus and chose
not to amend the existing ratio. In 2001, the Judiciary Committee
again asked the Sentencing Commission to recommend changes to
the 100:1 ratio. This time, the Commission issued a new report sug
gesting a 20:1 ratio. 62 Congress held hearings on this new proposal,
but it again did not reach a consensus to adopt it.
The debate over the crack-powder ratio has too often been
overheated and hyperbolic. 63 Let us begin, then, with a clarifica
tion. Some observers have erroneously taken the "100:1" ratio to
mean that crack sentences are "100 times longer" than powder
sentences. 64 However, it is important to understand that the
"100:1" ratio refers to drug quantity, not sentence lengths. Hence,
the best way to comprehend the felt disparity of the quantity ratio is
to hold quantity constant and compare the sentence lengths that
59. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts; No
tice, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,073, 25,076 (May 10, 1995).
60. H. REP. No. 104-272, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 337.
61. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 2, 5, 9 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 REPORT], available
at http://www.ussC.gov!r30ngressINEWCRACK.PDF.
62. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FED
ERAL SENTENCING POLICY 107 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 REPORT], available at http://
www.ussc.gov/ccongress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf.
63. Representative Maxine Waters, a leading member of the Congressional Black
Caucus, has accused the CIA of starting the crack epidemic, as part of a plot to fund the
Nicaraguan Contras. Spade, supra note 49, at 1244. Reverend Jesse Jackson has de
cried the crack-powder ratio, declaring, "It's racist, it's ungodly, it must change." /d. at
1276. On the other side of the issue, Senator Paula Hawkins, speaking in favor of the
1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, said, "Drugs pose a clear and present danger to America's
national security .... This is a bill which has far-reaching impact on the future of civili
zation as we know it." 132 CONGo REC. 26,436 (1986)_
64. See, e.g., Nkechi Taifa, The "Crack/Powder" Disparity: Can the International
Race Convention Provide a Basis for Relief!, AM. CONST. Soc. L. & POL., May 2006, at
2, available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Crack_Powder_Cocaine_Disparity.pdf (de
scribing crack penalties as "one hundred times more severe" than powder penalties).
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result from the Guidelines algorithm. Making these conversions,
the 100:1 drug quantity ratio translates into a sentence length ratio
that varies from roughly 8:1 to 1:1. The ratio is smallest at the high
and low ends of the Offense Level (i.e., quantity) spectrum, and the
ratio also gets smaller as the Criminal History Score increases. 65
The median ratio is roughly 3:1, but the ratio is larger for quantity
amounts in the middle of the spectrum (quantities between four
and 300 grams).66
Clarification aside, a 3:1 real sentence differential is quite large
and no less deserving of the criticism it has endured. Yet, it remains
important-and will be particularly important to the argument of
this Article-to articulate precisely why the cocaine ratio is prob
lematic. Unfortunately, much of the debate has tended to focus on
two red herrings, thereby failing to reach the heart of the problem.
The first of these red herrings is the argument that crack and pow
der cocaine are indistinguishable substances, since the active ingre
dient in each is cocaine alkaloid. 67 The powder and crack varieties
simply allow for different delivery mechanisms of the same active
ingredient. However, while this observation may be formally true,
it obscures real and serious functional differences between the
drugs. Powder cocaine can be snorted, ingested, or injected; crack
can only be smoked. These different methods of use affect how
quickly and efficiently the cocaine reaches the bloodstream, and
thus they control the drug's degree of impact on the body. The
Sentencing Commission explained, "The risk and severity of addic
tion to cocaine is directly related to the method by which the drug is
administered into the body .... Smoking ... produces the quickest
onset, shortest duration, and most intense effects, and therefore
produces the greatest risk of addiction."68 This difference in man
ner of use makes crack inherently more addictive than powder, de
spite the same active ingredient. 69
Crack differs from powder in additional ways. Dose-for-dose,
the street price of crack is much lower than powder, and the profit
65. Indeed, the Commission itself has pointed out the perversity of this result.
See 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 99-100.
66. These ratios are based on the author's calculations, based on data in the U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, at 133-39, 376. See infra figs.3 & 4.
67. 1995 REpORT, supra note 47, at 12.
68. 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 93. Crack has been estimated to put users at a
fifty times greater risk of addiction than powder. Spade, supra note 49, at 1262.
69. If powder cocaine is injected, it does put the user at similar risk of addictive
ness as smoking crack. 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 93-94. However, only 2.8 per
cent of powder cocaine users inject it. Id.
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margins for dealers are much higher. 70 This makes crack a more
lucrative business for street gangs and organized crime.?l It also
makes crack more likely to prey on the most vulnerable poor and
young users. To the extent drug policy should be based on deter
rence rationales, a cheaper and more lucrative drug demands stiffer
penalties to discourage dealing and use. Moreover, although social
scientists do not all agree, many scholars-and many more anecdo
tal observers-have noted the unique damage crack has inflicted on
communities through its association with violent crime and other
forms of criminality and child neglectJ 2 For example, one study
found that 60 percent of drug-related New York City homicides in
1988 were due to crack. 73 Another recent study has found that
crack is associated with a 5 percent increase in overall violent and
property crime between 1984 and 1989.74
The second red herring in the debate over the 100:1 ratio is the
argument that the ratio punishes African-Americans more harshly
than other groups. Crack is often thought of as a "black drug," and
powder cocaine is considered a "white drug." Eighty-five percent
of federal crack offenders are African-American, whereas 69 per
cent of powder cocaine offenders are white or Hispanic.?5 The har
sher penalties for crack have been a major reason for the
disproportionately large African-American prison population. This
fact has led to cries of "racism,"76 and also more sophisticated ob
jections based on "disproportionate impact."77
However, these objections to the 100:1 ratio only see half of
the picture. They fail to account for the enormous damage crack
does to African-American communities. Indeed, a recent study has
found that crack contributed substantially to homicide rates of Afri
can-American males and that crack explains much of the observed
70. Like any kind of product innovation, consumers and producers of crack share
in the surplus created by a more efficient drug.
71. See 1995 REPORT, supra note 47, at 85-87, 89-90.
72. See id. at 93-109 (summarizing various research findings).
73. Id. at 96.
74. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et aI., Measuring the Impact of Crack Cocaine 6-7 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11318, 2005), available at http://price
theory.uchicago.edu/levittlPaperslFryerHeatonLevittMurphy2OOS.pdf. Although the
study observes that the link between crack and crime is less apparent in the 1990s, it
attributes this in part to the "declining profitability of crack distribution." Id. at 7. The
magnitude and likelihood of penalties for distribution are a key factor in profitability.
75. Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack:Powder Disparity- The Data
Tell Us that it is Time to Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT'O REP. 87, 89 (2003).
76. See Taifa, supra note 64, at 1.
77. Sklansky, supra note 55, at 1289-90.
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increases in low birth weight babies, fetal death, child mortality,
and unwed births in African-American communities. 78 In contrast,
crack has had no apparent effect on these variables for white com
munities.7 9 Hence, lower penalties and less enforcement for crack
offenses might arguably treat African-American drug dealers more
"equally," but such leniency would inflict a disparate negative im
pact on the innocent African-American communities the dealers
victimize. Protecting victims of crime is a ·basic duty owed by the
state to all communities, and indeed one way in which racism his
torically oppressed African-Americans was by denying them this
important right. 80 It would be a perverse kind of racial justice that
abandoned protection of the majority of law-abiding African
Americans in the name of leniency for their African-American vic
timizers. As one African-American scholar has aptly put it, "we
ought to commend rather than condemn the legislature's distinction
between crack and powdered cocaine."81 He explained, "If it is
true that blacks as a class are disproportionately victimized by the
conduct punished by the statute at issue, then it follows that blacks
as a class may be helped by measures reasonably thought to dis
courage such conduct."82
David Sklansky, a prominent critic of the 100:1 ratio, replies to
this objection to the disparate impact theory by arguing that the
ratio's impact on African-American defendants must be viewed in
light of the public and legislative atmosphere in which the 100:1
ratio was born. 83 Sklansky characterizes this atmosphere as
78. Fryer et aI., supra note 74, at 6.
79. Id.
80. African-American legal scholar Regina Austin has observed, "Drive-by
shootings and random street crime have replaced lynchings as a source of intimidation,
and the 'culture of terror' practiced by armed crack dealers and warring adolescents has
turned them into the urban equivalents of the Ku Klux Klan." Regina Austin, "The
Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1769, 1772 (1992). Another scholar echoes the point:
Racially invidious under-enforcement purposefully denies African-American
victims of violence the things that all persons legitimately expect from the
state: civil order and, in the event that crimes are committed, best efforts to
apprehend and punish offenders. For most of the nation's history, blacks were
denied this public good. . .. In many contexts, in comparison to the treatment
accorded to whites, blacks have been denied quite literally the equal protec
tion of the law.
Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1267-68 (1994) (citations omitted).
81. Kennedy, supra note 80, at 1269.
82. Id.
83. See Ski an sky, supra note 55, at 1300.
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"tinged" with racial stereotyping. 84 He also argues that the 100:1
ratio emerged because whites were worried about the spread of
crack, a "black drug," into white communities. 85 However, while
Sklansky's evidence of stereotyping is not conclusive, it is also irrel
evant. Even if crack was widely considered a "black drug" associ
ated with black communities, the 100:1 ratio can be seen as a
welcome effort by Congress to solve a "black problem." Moreover,
if the 100:1 ratio was instead a reaction to the spread of crack into
white communities, Congress would be guilty not of creating the
100:1 ratio, but rather of failing to create it sooner than it did. In
any case, conscious and unconscious motivations with regard to
race can be very difficult to discern. Instead of such speculation, we
are better off taking legislators at their word-and thus understand
ing the 100:1 ratio as an attempt to stop the destruction crack was
inflicting on the most vulnerable communities. In the words of
Florida Representative E. Clay Shaw, one of the sponsors of the
1986 Act which created the 100:1 ratio, "[I]n Dade County, in
Broward County, and Palm Beach County that I represent, and as a
matter of fact right here in this Nation's Capital in the minority
areas, they are saying come in and arrest the drug traffickers, get
them out of our neighborhood."86
Unfortunately, fixation upon the two red herrings discussed
above has served to confuse and obscure a much more powerful
argument against the 100:1 ratio. When Congress passed the Anti
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, it explicitly aimed to target "serious" and
"major" drug traffickers more harshly than small-time dealers. 87
Indeed, this was the purpose behind the Act's new two-tiered
mandatory minimum scheme, which tied mandatory minimums to
drug quantity.88 In Senator Robert Byrd's words, the ten-year min
imum was for "the kingpins-the masterminds who are really run
ning these operations," the five-year minimum was for "the middle
84. Id. at 1291-94 (describing the legislative atmosphere); id. at 1300-01 (defend
ing the disparate impact theory); see also id. at 1292 ("[T]he drug of primary concern
was strongly associated in the white public mind with a particular racial minority.").
85. [d. at 1295.
86. 141 CONGo REc. 28,357 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Shaw). Others prefer not to
take such legislators at their word. Representative Maxine Waters caustically replied to
Shaw, "I do not want [Representative Shaw] to ever believe that he cares more about
my community than 1 do. 1 do not want the gentleman to think that somehow his
policies and his beliefs are right for my community." Id. (statement of Rep. Waters).
So much for the idea of the "public interest."
87. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000».
88. See id.
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level dealers," and quantities below the level that would trigger the
minimums were reserved for low-level dealers and users.89 Ironi
cally, however, Congress's simultaneous zeal to get tough on crack
offenders entirely undermined this broader effort to single out
high-level traffickers for harsher punishment. The 100:1 ratio ig
nores the realities of drug distribution networks, where low-level
dealers and users are more likely than higher-level traffickers to
feel the hammer of crack sentences. 90 In practice, the broad goal of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the narrow goal of the Act's 100:1
ratio work at cross-purposes, and the 100:1 ratio has managed to
swallow the fundamental retributive and deterrent aims of the Act.
According to the Sentencing Commission's 1995 report, "crack
cocaine offenders differ characteristically (e.g., smaller range of ac
tivity, less likely to be characterized as performing important func
tions) from other drug offenders at the higher penalty levels. "91
According to the Commission's data, the majority (59.6 percent) of
convicted crack offenders were low-level dealers while low-level
dealers composed a minority (31.2 percent) of powder offenders. 92
Indeed, a more recent Commission report suggests that the percent
age of convicted crack offenders with a low-level role has increased
to 66.5 percent. 93 High-level traffickers tend to deal in powder co
caine, and then distribute it to lower-level dealers who convert it to
crack prior to selling it. Hence, the 100:1 ratio effectively punishes
the lower end of the distribution network more severely than the
higher end. The ratio has created a system that gives the least seri
ous punishment to the most serious offender and the most serious
punishment to the least serious offender. One would be hard
pressed to find a more perfect way to frustrate the goals of just
punishment and effective deterrence.
The perversity of the 100:1 ratio emerges even more clearly
when we take a concrete look at the economics of drug distribution.
Crack tends to be sold on the street in small, single-dose quantities
of roughly 250 milligrams per dose. 94 According to data from the
89. 132 CONGo REC. 14,300 (1986) (statement of Sen. Byrd). The House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime also echoed Senator Byrd's sentiments. See Spade, supra note
49, at 1253.
90. See 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 99.
91. 1995 REPORT, supra note 47, at 193.
92. Id. at 172 tbl.18.
93. 2002 REPORT, supra note 62, at 38 fig.5.
94. 1995 REPORT, supra note 47, at 85. Quantities and prices can vary widely.
The author's calculations are based on numbers in the middle of the ranges reported by
the Commission.
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early 1990s, this "dime bag" would sell for roughly $10. 95 In con
trast, powder cocaine tends to be sold in larger five-to-ten dose
units of roughly one gram each, at a price around $85 per unit. 96
Comparing the sentences of low-level crack and powder cocaine
dealers with each other reveals a sizeable, but not outrageous, dis
parity. Assuming he is a first-time offender, a low-level dealer
caught with enough powder to make five one-gram sales would re
ceive a Guidelines sentence of ten to sixteen months.97 That same
offender caught with enough crack for five equivalent 250-milli
gram sales would receive a Guidelines sentence of twenty-seven to
thirty-three months. In this example, the offenders have equally
culpable roles in the drug network, but the crack dealer's sentence
is almost three times as long. Some may consider this unfair, and
others may believe it reflects the relative social harms caused by the
two drugs. But now let us compare low-level crack dealers with
high-level powder dealers. Imagine a drug trafficker who distrib
utes his 500 grams of powder cocaine to eighty-nine street-level
dealers. After converting the powder into crack, each dealer will
have roughly five grams of crack, which will enable him to make
twenty sales for a total of $200. 98 The high-level trafficker will thus
be responsible for 1,780 street sales of crack worth almost $18,000
and sold by eighty-nine different dealers. For this crime, the high
level trafficker would receive a Guidelines sentence of sixty-three
to seventy-eight months. However, since they converted the pow
der into crack, each of the eighty-nine low-level dealers would re
ceive an identical sixty-three to seventy-eight-month sentence.
Under the 100:1 ratio, these minor street dealers are treated as
harshly as the major kingpin.
One final example will suffice to drive home the point. In an
actual case, two low-level dealers purchased 225 grams of powder
cocaine from a higher-level supplier. 99 When they converted the
powder into crack, they were disappointed to discover that the
powder yielded only eighty-eight grams, rather than the typical 200.
They complained to their supplier, and he agreed to trade the de
fective crack for a new 225-gram batch of powder. When the two
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2Dl.l(c), at 133
39 (offense levels); id. at 376 (sentencing table).
98. This assumes a cocaine-crack conversion rate of 0.89. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
99. 1995 REPORT, supra note 47, at 193-94.
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dealers returned to the supplier with their eighty-eight grams of
crack, they were arrested before they could complete the trade.
The supplier was subsequently arrested for selling the original 225
grams of powder. Although the supplier and the dealers were all
first-time offenders, the supplier received a thirty-three to forty
one-month sentence while the lower-level dealers each received a
121 to 151-month sentence.l oo
In sum, the 100:1 ratio often treats low-level crack offenders as
severely as, and sometimes even more severely than, high-level
powder offenders. Moreover, high-level drug offenders are, gener
ally, more likely to deal in powder than in crack. The ratio is
plainly bad policy. Some difference between crack and powder
sentences may be justified by the unique harms inflicted by crack.
However, the 100:1 ratio corrects a disparity in harm at the price of
creating a much greater disparity in culpability. The 100:1 ratio
may not be so problematic for sentencing higher-level crack offend
ers, but in cases involving low-level dealers or users of crack, it seri
ously thwarts the aims of fair and just punishment.
B.

Substantive Reasonableness

As thus far shown, the 100:1 ratio can, in some instances, pro
duce perverse and unfair results. However, the chief flaw in the
ratio stems not from the pharmacological similarity of crack and
powder, nor from the ratio's disparate racial impact, but rather
from a deeper source. The 100:1 ratio distorts the justice system's
ability to assign punishment on the basis of culpability and just
deserts. Recognizing this reality, though also indulging other argu
ments against the ratio, the Sentencing Commission has proposed
that the ratio be reduced to 20:1, 10:1, or even 5:1.101 A smaller
ratio would recognize the unique harm inflicted by crack, but it
would limit the ratio's tendency to distort punishment based on cul
pability. Congress, however, has yet to take the Commission's
advice.
What then, in the wake of Booker, should judges do? When
sentencing a crack defendant, should judges apply the 100:1 Guide
lines ratio, or should they venture away from it on their own?
When faced with this question, the first instinct of many judges has
been to think in terms of "substantive reasonableness." The
Booker Court made the Guidelines "advisory" and required judges
100.
10l.

Id.
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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to impose "reasonable" sentences in accord with the dictates of
§ 3553(a). Under § 3553(a), courts must consider a list of more
than ten factors, including the applicable Guidelines range,102 "the
nature and circumstances of the offense,"103 the need for the sen
tence imposed to "reflect the seriousness of the offense,"l04 the
need for the sentence to be "sufficient, but not greater than neces
sary,"105 and the need for the sentence to "afford adequate deter
rence."106 However, most relevant to the question of the 100:1
ratio is § 3553(a)(6), which requires judges to consider "the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with sim
ilar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct."107
Through the lens of substantive reasonableness, judges have asked
themselves what sentence, based on the 100:1 ratio or a different
ratio, will best avoid "unwarranted disparity."
1.

Two Reasonable Approaches?

In the wake of Booker, § 3553(a)(6)'s command to avoid dis
parity has become the locus of concern for substantive discussion of
the 100:1 ratio. Yet, § 3553(a)(6) lends itself to two radically differ
ent conclusions. The first approach, which we might call the ex post
view, points to the disparities created by the Guidelines ratio. Al
though Booker and § 3553(a)(4)(A) require judges to "consider"
the Guidelines, § 3553(a)(6) requires judges to independently con
sider the issue of disparity.108 Hence, read most naturally,
§ 3553(a) permits judges to consider disparity within the Guidelines
and, thereby, weigh both § 3553(a) factors-the value of following
the Guidelines against the value of eliminating the supposed dispar
ity.109 As one judge explained, "The guideline'S [sic] treatment of
crack cocaine versus their treatment of powder cocaine ... may, in
102.

18 U.S.c. § 3553(a)(4)(A) (2000).
Id. § 3553(a)(1).
Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 3553(a).
Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
107. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
108. Id.
109. A close reading of § 3553(a), applying ordinary principles of statutory inter
pretation, suggests that § 3553(a)(6) should not be construed to simply require adher
ence to the Guidelines. Such an interpretation of § 3553(a)(6) would render
§ 3553(a)(4)(A)'s instruction to consider the Guidelines entirely superfluous. See
Michael M. Q'Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity: Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)
After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627 (2006) [hereinafter Q'Hear, The Duty to
Avoid Disparity].
103.
104.
105.
106.
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and of itself, create an unwarranted sentence disparity."llo In the
words of another judge, this disparity exists "between defendants
convicted of possessing powder cocaine and defendants convicted
of possessing crack cocaine. "111
Judges have also cited the 100:1 ratio's disparate racial impact
as a source of unwarranted disparity. For example, one judge ob
served, "Perhaps most troubling ... is that the unjustifiably harsh
crack penalties disproportionately impact on black defendants."112
Under this ex post approach, judges reason that the 100:1 ratio cre
ates unwarranted disparity between a crack defendant and defend
ants convicted of similar offenses (powder cocaine) or between
defendants who differ because of their race. 113 Both rationales are
consistent with § 3553(a)'s language, which refers both to the na
ture of the defendant ("defendants with similar records") and the
nature of his actions ("defendants ... who have been found guilty
of similar conduct").H 4 Judges cite these disparities and conclude
that § 3553(a)(6) requires them to replace the 100:1 ratio with a
different ratio, usually 20:1 or 10:l.
However, other judges relying on the same provision have
come to an opposite conclusion. Under this second approach,
which we might call the ex ante view, judges focus on the forward
looking impact of rejecting the 100:1 ratio and replacing it with a
lower ratio. In this view, a judicial decision to categorically reject
the 100:1 ratio creates a collective action problem. If every judge
110. United States v. Clay, No. 2:03CR73, 2005 WL 1076243, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.
May 6, 2005) (imposing a 156-month sentence where the Guidelines recommended 235
to 293 months).
111. United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 781 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (employing
a 20:1 ratio and imposing an 18-month sentence where the Guidelines recommended 41
to 51 months).
112. Id. at 780.
113. But cf U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5H1.10
(Commission policy statement deeming race to be a factor "not relevant" to the deter
mination of a sentence); 18 U.S.c. § 3553( a)(5) (requiring judges to consider "any perti
nent policy statement" issued by the Commission).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(b). Note that the reference to "conduct" rather than
"offenses" can lend itself to finding similarity between two defendants convicted of
different crimes whose "conduct" was nevertheless similar. But see O'Hear, The Duty
to Avoid Disparity, supra note 109, at 641-42 (arguing, based on text and legislative
history, that § 3553(a)(6) should be construed to refer only to disparities between de
fendants with the same offense of conviction, but concluding that crack and powder
offenses can be considered "similar crimes"). It should also be noted that § 3553(a)'s
reference to "similar records" suggests that Congress probably had something narrower
in mind than racially disparate impact. Although the disparate impact theory is plausi
ble, it is not entirely convincing.
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adopted the same smaller ratio, there would be no disparity. How
ever, one judge's choice to categorically abandon the 100:1 ratio
creates disparity between identical defendants, based simply on
which judge a defendant happens to be assigned. As one sentenc
ing judge explained his decision to abide by the 100:1 ratio, the
choice of a different ratio "would in all likelihood create greater
inter-court (and intra-court) sentencing disparity among federal of
fenders with similar records who commit identical offenses-that is,
among crack offenders."115 Echoing this sentiment, the Fourth Cir
cuit observed that "by its plain language, § 3553(a)(6) seeks to
bring about increased uniformity in the sentencing of similarly situ
ated defendants," and this uniformity is frustrated by "giving a sen
tencing court the authority to sentence a defendant based on its
view of an appropriate ratio."116
Moreover, the First Circuit pointed to another form of ex ante
disparity that would result from judicial rejection of the 100:1 ratio.
In contrast to the above inter-judge disparity, the existence of statu
tory mandatory minimums based on the 100:1 ratio would create
intra-judge disparities among defendants, regardless of whether
they are sentenced by different judges. Since the five- and ten-year
mandatory minimums reflect the 100:1 ratio, rejecting the ratio
while abiding by the mandatory minimums would create a huge dis
parity between defendants possessing quantities large enough to
trigger the minimums and those possessing only a small amount
less. For example, under the Guidelines, a first-time offender pos
sessing 49 grams of crack would receive a sentence of 97 to 121
months. An identical offender possessing 50 grams of crack,
enough to trigger the ten-year mandatory minimum, would receive
a statutorily mandated 120-month sentence. If a judge rejects the
100:1 ratio and instead applies a 20:1 ratio to the first offender, his
sentence becomes 63 to 78 months. As the First Circuit observed,
"a one-gram difference in drug quantity would create a huge sen
tencing differential (nearly fifty percent)."117
2.

The Clash of Disparities

The different conclusions reached by the ex post and ex ante
views of the 100:1 ratio produce a veritable clash of disparities. Ju
115. United States v. Doe, 412 F. Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D.D.C. 2006).
116. United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed
(No. 05-11659 June 20, 2006).
117. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2006).
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dicial critics and proponents of the ratio each have their own pet
disparities, and each side can use its own disparities to rebut those
of the other. The ex post critics of the 100:1 ratio point to dispari
ties resulting from the ratio's treatment of similar offenses or of
fenders in radically different ways. In this view, maintaining the
100:1 ratio furthers drug type disparity and racial disparity. In con
trast, the ex ante defenders of the 100:1 ratio point to disparities
that would result from individual judges deciding to categorically
treat a class of offenders more leniently than other judges would
treat that class, or more leniently than the same judge would have
to treat similar classes (e.g., those crack offenders subject to
mandatory minimums). In this view, rejecting the 100:1 ratio cre
ates inter-judge disparity and intra-judge disparity. Alas, neither
the concept of disparity, nor the words and intent of § 3553(a)(6),
can provide a rationale for choosing one kind of disparity over an
other. With regard to the 100:1 ratio, § 3553(a)(6) has no determi
native content.
Standing alone, the concept of "unwarranted disparity" be
comes either circular or incoherent. An unwarranted disparity re
sults when two similar defendants are treated dissimilarly, but what
counts as meaningful dissimilarities are those dissimilarities that are
unwarranted. This is the circular version of "unwarranted dispar
ity." Instead of making "unwarranted disparity" a criterion of it
self, the incoherent version considers "disparity" to be modified by
"unwarranted" and asks judges to somehow distinguish between
"warranted" and "unwarranted" disparities. Indeed, this version
seems to be what Congress intended when it drafted the statute. As
explained in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, "The key
word in discussing unwarranted sentence disparities is 'unwar
ranted.' "118 While this is true enough, the incoherence results from
the fact that § 3553(a)(6) supplies no criteria for determining what
is and is not warranted; by itself, "warrantedness" is an incoherent
criterion. 119 Hence, to become coherent, the concept of disparity
must find some external principle on which to rely.
118. S. REP. No. 95-605, at 1161 (1977).
119. Many scholars and judges have come to the same conclusion with respect to
disparity, or its opposite, uniformity. See, e.g., Doe, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 94 ("Disparity is
a normative principle that necessarily encompasses a judgment about which characteris
tics of the offense (or the offender) should matter and which characteristics should
not."); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 105 ("The trouble begins when we move
beyond this slogan [of unwarranted disparity] and ask what factors should be consid
ered in deciding whether particular crimes and particular criminals are 'similar' or 'dis
similar' . . . ."); Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal
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Yet, searching for such a principle in § 3553(a)(6) feels like
searching for water in an arid desert. Indeed, the legislative history
of § 3553(a)(6) offers no more than a mirage, for it suggests that
Congress had both ex post and ex ante disparity in mind when it
wrote the statute. One Senate Judiciary Committee Report noted
that the requirement to avoid unwarranted disparity establishes of
fense and offender characteristics "as the principal determinants of
whether two offenders' cases are so similar that a difference be
tween their sentences should be considered a disparity."12o This
echoes the ex post view. However, the same report noted, in refer
ence to disparity, "The offender before [a particular judge] should
not receive more favorable or less favorable treatment solely by vir
tue of the sheer chance that he is to be sentenced by a particular
judge. "121 This echoes the ex ante view.
In short, the clash between ex post and ex ante views of crack
sentencing disparity and the decision about which kind of disparity
to avoid-drug type disparity, racial disparity, inter-judge disparity,
or intra-judge disparity-cannot be resolved by the terms of
§ 3553(a)(6) or its legislative history. One scholar has aptly com
pared § 3553(a)(6)'s "uniformity ideal" to the old "rehabilitative
ideal" that used to dominate the sentencing agenda.1 22 Like the
older ideal, the new ideal "embraces great complexity and, indeed,
encompasses widely different and even conflicting kinds of social
policies."123 Moreover, any hope of turning to § 3553(a)'s other
factors in search of a criterion for "unwarranted disparity" runs into
even more indeterminacy. The ex post approach might further the
need to consider the "nature and circumstances of the offense"
(§ 3553(a)(1» and "provide just punishment" (§ 3553(a)(2)(A»,
Sentencing, 74 U. eIN. L. REV. 749 (2006) [hereinafter O'Hear, The Original Intent of
Uniformity in Federal Sentencing] ("[U]niformity seeks to eliminate unwarranted sen
tencing disparities, but also to provide for warranted disparities. The problem lies in
distinguishing the warranted from the unwarranted."); Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of
Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 ("[R]educing sentencing disparity
... requires a coherent underlying theory of punishment, because disparity is not a self
defining concept. ").
120. S. REp. No. 95-605, at 1161.
121. Id. at 893; see also S. REp. No. 98-225, at 161 (1983) ("Each sentence will be
the result of careful consideration of the particular characteristics of the offense and the
offender, rather than being dependent on the identity of the sentencing judge and the
nature of his sentencing philosophy.").
122. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, supra note
119, at 791 (quoting FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL:
PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 2 (1981)).
123. Id.
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but the ex ante approach might do a better job of taking the Guide
lines into account (§ 3553(a)(4)), "promot[ing] respect for the law"
(§ 3553(a)(2)(A)), and "afford[ing] adequate deterrence"
(§ 3553(a)(2)(B)).n4 And neither approach will tell us what sen
tence is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" (§ 3553(a)),
since we cannot yet define what is "necessary." Indeed, Judge Pos
ner has observed the "indeterminate and interminable character of
inquiry into the meaning and application of each of the 'philosophi
cal' concepts in which section 3553(a) abounds."125 Through the
lens of substantive reasonableness, neither § 3553(a)(6)'s command
to avoid disparity nor the rest of § 3553(a)'s grab bag of sentencing
factors can adequately resolve the crack-powder issue.
III.

BEYOND THE CLASH OF DISPARITIES

At this point it is helpful to pause and remember Alexander
Bickel's quip, "no answer is what the wrong question begets."126
As observed in the previous Part, the substantive approach to the
crack-powder issue leads to analytical gridlock. In this Part, I ex
plore a more promising path.
A.

Structural Reasonableness

Substantive reasonableness asked, "What is the correct sen
tence for this defendant?" In contrast, structural reasonableness
asks a more elementary question: "Who should make particular
kinds of decisions related to sentencing?" The substantive ap
proach focused on the "what" and "why"; the structural approach
focuses on the "who" and "how."127 This distinction may seem sub
124. 18 U.S.c. § 3553(a) (2000).
125. United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005).
126. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 103 (2d ed. 1986).
127. Some appellate courts have recognized a distinction between "substantive"
and "procedural" reasonableness review. The former relates to the actual quantum of
the sentence given, and the latter usually refers to the duty to calculate the applicable
guidelines range or consult § 3553(a). See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373,
383-85 (6th Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 16621 (6th Cir. 2005) (en
banc); United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 n.3 (6th CiT. 2006). As explained in
the previous Part, my conception of "substantive reasonableness" encompasses both of
those kinds of review. Hence, the use of the term "structural reasonableness" to distin
guish something different-the need to consider the nature of the decision and the deci
sion-maker in the sentencing calculus. My concept of "structural reasonableness" also
differs from how another scholar has conceptualized sentencing reasonableness. Eric
Citron, United States v. Pho: Reasons and Reasonableness in Post-Booker Appellate
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 2183 (2006). In that article, the author distinguishes between
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tle or semantic, but it has significant consequences as to how judges
think about sentencing. The dominance of the substantive ap
proach in the wake of Booker, particularly among district court
judges, should not be surprising. Prior to Booker, most of the struc
tural questions had already been answered by Congress or the Sen
tencing Commission, through narrowly circumscribed judicial
discretion and sharply delineated permissible and impermissible
reasons for Guidelines departures. 128 However, in the wake of
Booker, our evolving reasonableness regime demands renewed en
gagement with the basic structural questions at the heart of the sen
tencing process. Indeed, it demands heightened engagement since
trial judges and appellate courts have taken on new obligations as
stewards of the entire system's "reasonableness." A complete reck
oning of post-Booker structural questions lies beyond the scope of
this ArticleP9 However, this Part will attempt to elaborate and ap
ply the structural perspective as it relates to the crack-powder issue.
Two recent scholars have observed, "the sentencing decision is
properly viewed as a series of decisions-each of which is impor
tantly different from the others and each of which can best be per
formed by a decisionmaker with certain qualities."13o In contrast to
"reasonable-length" review and "reasons-based" review, arguing that review of
sentences under Booker should be based "not on the terms imposed but on the reasons
given for imposing them." Id. at 2184. However, the author does not address the ques
tion central to this Article: In crack sentencing, which reasons should count and why?
The author argues that reasonableness review should be about "reasons," rather than
merely about sentence lengths. While my concept of reasonableness review encom
passes this insight, I go further by arguing that certain kinds of reasons (structural ones)
should take precedence over other kinds of reasons (substantive ones).
128. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
129. One relevant and particularly important structural issue to which the appel
late courts have indeed given some attention involves the question of what role the
"advisory" Guidelines play in a determination of "reasonableness." Most circuits have
held that Guidelines sentences should be accorded a "presumption of reasonableness,"
but at least one circuit has deemed a Guidelines sentence to be unreasonable. Compare
United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that guidelines sentences
are presumptively reasonable), with United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928, 933 (8th
Cir. 2006) (finding that a guidelines sentence was unreasonable, since "a number of
circumstances make this case highly unusual"). Two recent scholars have also at
tempted to grapple with the structural question head-on. However, unlike this Article,
they work at a very high level of abstraction and their analysis yields few concrete
doctrinal or practical results. See Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing
Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1124 (2005). Robinson and Spellman build a valuable foundation, but I believe struc
tural issues may be more profitably explored through engagement with actual sentenc
ing disputes. Cf Webb, 403 F.3d at 383 ("[W]e believe it prudent to permit a
clarification of [reasonableness] concepts to evolve on a case-by-case basis.").
130. Robinson & Spellman, supra note 129, at 1128.
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the substantive issue of "unwarranted disparity," the key structural
issue in cocaine sentencing is whether judges should categorically
alter the 100:1 crack-powder ratio-that is, whether the question of
the proper ratio is best resolved by Congress or the judiciary. A
judge's sentence in crack cases really involves two different deci
sions-a policy judgment about the appropriate categorical ratio to
apply and an individualized judgment about the particular of
fender's unique culpability.13 1 In this Part, I seek to disentangle
these two different sentencing decisions, and I argue that policy de
cisions are better left to Congress while individualized decisions
should rest with the sentencing judge. In concrete terms, this
means that structural reasonableness requires judges to abide by
the 100:1 ratio but permits them to deviate from the Guidelines in
individual cases where they find that the defendant's lesser culpa
bility warrants deviation.
In requiring adherence to the 100:1 ratio, a number of courts
have appealed to the notion that determining the proper ratio be
tween crack and powder sentences is a "policy judgment" better left
to the legislature. As one sentencing judge lamented, "I should de
fer to the choice of penalties that Congress has made for crack co
caine even though I would quickly do something different if it were
within my proper role to choose."132 Although relying mostly on
substantive arguments about disparity, the Fourth Circuit also ob
served that "sentencing courts should not be in the business of mak
ing legislative judgments concerning crack cocaine and powder
cocaine."133 Finally, the First Circuit has given the loudest voice to
this perspective, noting that the 100:1 ratio remains "a policy judg
ment, pure and simple."134 The court elaborated, "Matters of pol
icy typically are for Congress. [I]n the absence of constitutional
infirmity, federal courts are bound by Congress's policy judgments,
including judgments concerning the appropriate penalties for fed
eral crimes."135 In this view, judges should apply § 3553(a)'s factors
in an individualized manner to the particular defendants before
131. Cf John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) (distinguish
ing between the decision to justify a practice and the decision to justify a particular
action falling under that practice).
132. United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1060 (D. Neb. 2005) (rejecting
crack defendant's request for a lower sentence), affd, 439 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006),
petition for cert. filed (No. 06-5244 May 31, 2006).
133. United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed
(No. 05-11659 June 20, 2006).
134. United Stated v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2006).
135. Id. (citations omitted).
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them,136 but they should not be in the business of making categori
cal decisions about sentencing policy.
B.

The "Policy" Distinction

In reaching this conclusion, these judges have seized upon a
powerful and ultimately persuasive intuition. However, the basis of
the structural argument remains vague and inarticulate. The courts
have asserted that judges should not "make policy judgments," but
they have failed both to justify the assertion and to define what
counts as "policy." This leaves the structural approach vulnerable
to critics who claim that it is incoherent-indeed, one might think
that the structural focus on "policy" is no better in this regard than
the substantive focus on "disparity." For example, sentencing
scholar Douglas Berman has argued, "[A]ll judicial sentencing deci
sions plainly are, at some level, policy judgments informed by views
on just punishment, crime control, procedural fairness, and other
express and implicit considerations. "137 Another observer makes
the point even more provocatively, claiming, "Those who say judges
shouldn't impose sentences based on policy are clinging desperately
to the last shards of a mandatory Guidelines system."138 These crit
ics make fair points, but I believe the objections rest on some fun
damental misunderstandings. Hence, in this Part, let us articulate
the structural argument more clearly, asking first what we mean by
"policy judgments" and second why judges should refrain from
making them. We will then apply this general analysis to the crack
powder issue.
The critics are correct to note that, in some sense, a judge
"makes policy" every time she makes a ruling. In Holmesian terms,
one might think that policy is a "prophec[y] of what the courts will
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious."139 Nobody disputes the
first half of Holmes' remark-that every judicial decision may have
the consequence of policy-for every decision affects the rights and
136. See Eura, 440 F.3d at 634-39 (Michael, J., concurring).
137. Posting of Douglas Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, http://
sentencing. typepad. com/sentencing_law _and_policy /2006/05/ policy _judgment. html
(May 7, 2006,16:51 EST) (emphasis omitted) (posting titled "Policy Judgments at Fed
eral Sentencing: Aren't They Inevitable and Mandated by Congress?").
138. Posting of David Lewis to Sentencing Law and Policy Blog, http://sentencing.
typepad.com/sentencin~law_and_policy/2006/05/policyjudgment.html (May 8, 2006,
10:51 EST) (responding to posting of Douglas Berman).
139. Cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more preten
tious, are what I mean by the law.").
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fortunes of individuals in some way. However, the second half of
Holmes' remark-that consequences are all that matter-is more
contestable and indeed highlights the key area of disagreement.
Our intuition that judges should not make policy runs deeper than
consequences and rests on concerns about the nature of judicial de
cisions. To side with Holmes and the critics is to claim that judicial
decisions do not differ fundamentally in their nature; they are all of
the same kind, and that kind has only substantive and no structural
content. I believe our intuitions about the nature of sentencing de
cisions run in the other direction. The courts have been right to
distinguish a policy-based decision as a particular kind of sentenc
ing decision.
What, then, defines whether a decision has the nature of pol
icy? While no simple answer presents itself, one can identify policy
rationales by a set of five defining qualities: principle, generality,
prospectivity, the nature of the facts, and legislative intent. One
can find hints at each of these factors in the cases discussing the
crack-powder ratio, and also in other areas of the law,140 but they
have not yet been appreciated.
1.

Principle

Efforts to identify uniquely legislative judgments often distin
guish between the choice of foundational principles and the choice
of how to apply those principles in an individual case. 141 This factor
has been conceptualized in various ways. As one judge put it rather
morbidly, "[T]he determination that one crime is 'worse' for society
than another crime ... is a ... value judgment. . .. [W]hen it comes
to punishment, judges lack the legitimacy of legislators ... to create
their own categories of evil."142 In this view, legislative policy judg
ments are the kind of judgments that establish the deep premises
underlying sentencing. As a general principle becomes more spe
cific, it loses the aura of policy and takes on that of application.
Other observers have suggested that certain kinds of principled
judgments are better suited to legislative policymaking than to ad
140. Administrative law sometimes makes an analogous distinction between "leg
islative" and "adjudicative" agency decisions. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S.
373 (1908) (holding that a municipal tax levied on a select group of property owners
required individualized adjudication), with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equali
zation, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding that a general tax levied on all taxable prop
erty did not require individual adjudication).
141. See generally Rawls, supra note 131.
142. United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (D. Neb. 2005), affd, 439
F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed (No. 06-5244 May 31, 2006).
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judication. For example, John Rawls argued that utilitarian and re
tributive punishment theories can be reconciled, since "utilitarian
arguments are appropriate with regard to questions about practices
[i.e., policy], while retributive arguments fit the application of par
ticular rules to particular cases."143 In a related vein, Douglas
Berman has suggested a distinction between offense conduct and
offender characteristics, the former being better suited for legisla
tion and proof at trial and the latter being better left to the discre
tion of judges. 144
2.

Generality

Another way of identifying a policy decision is to look at the
scope of its application. Policy judgments tend to affect a large
number of people, and they tend to treat people as part of a statisti
cal mass. They speak categorically. As one judge has put it, "for a
judge to independently designate categories of offenders and of
fenses for singular treatment is tantamount to the establishment of
sentencing policy. "145
3.

Prospectivity

Policy judgments tend to be forward-looking in nature, while
adjudicative judgments tend to be backward-looking. Policy judg
ments have a strong predictive effect. They are made in order to
affect the future, not usually to account for some particular past act.
4.

Nature of the facts

Policy judgments tend to apply broadly to a variety of factual
situations. They do not require detailed knowledge of the particu
lar situations to which they apply, and they do not depend on facts
that are difficult to quantify and ascertain in the aggregate.
143. Rawls, supra note 131, at 5.
144. Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Charac
teristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277,287 (2005) ("Trials are
about establishing the specific-offense conduct that the state believes merits criminal
punishment; sentencing is about assessing both the offense and the offender in order to
impose a just and effective punishment.").
145. United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1376 (M.D. Fla.
2006); see also United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2006) (characterizing the
district court's rejection of the 100:1 ratio as "categorical, policy-based"); United States
v. Doe, 412 F. Supp. 2d 87, 97 (D.C.C. 2006) ("But what Congress's policy choice does
mean is that courts cannot categorically treat as similar that which Congress has chosen
to treat as dissimilar. ").
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Legislative intent

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, policy judgments can be
defined in functional terms. Even if one rejects the search for a
Platonic definition of "policy," one can still accept the Forrest
Gump version: Policy is as policy does. That is, something becomes
a policy issue primarily because Congress has chosen to make it so.
This is what the Framers meant when they vested the "legislative
power" in Congress. l46
Of course, one can quibble with the ability of individual factors
to describe our intuitions about policy, and one can also quibble
with the application of anyone of these factors. Taken together,
however, the five factors seem to acquire some descriptive and de
terminative power. Let us now move to our second question. Once
a policy judgment has been identified as such, why should judges
defer such judgments to the legislature? Here, the argument is fa
miliar and rests on concerns related to democratic representation
and accountability and the comparative institutional competence of
judges and legislatures. Judges abiding by the 100:1 ratio have in
voked these themes. One judge colorfully explained his restraint:
To be clear, if I were the "King," I would adopt [a 20:1 ratio]. My
disagreement with judges who use Booker to [adopt their own
ratios] is not primarily that their reasons are faulty in the ab
stract, but that they give insufficient deference to Congress' con
trary, but reasonable, policy preferences. 147

Under the old rehabilitative ideal of criminal sentencing, judi
cial discretion posed few problems. Only judges could adequately
assess an offender's potential for rehabilitation. In many ways, the
rehabilitative model conceived of punishment as a private matter
between judge and defendant. However, as our sentencing system
came to embrace theories of punishment such as retribution, deter
rence, and incapacitation, it has encompassed broader values and
concerns that affect the entire political community-values that are
the subject of public interest. As such, these concerns demand res
olution in a public, democratic manner. More practically, judges
lack the institutional capacity to make policy judgments in a consis
tent way. Since policy judgments tend to be categorical, they are
better made at the legislative level than through a number of dispa
rate decisions by various judges. This appeal to consistency in ap
art. I, § 1.

146.

U.S.

147.

Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 n.9.

CONST.
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plication of the law returns us to that old nutshell of disparity. But
disparity becomes coherent once one concludes that Congress has
made a policy choice that allows one to distinguish between "war
ranted" and "unwarranted" disparity. If Congress has a clear and
ascertainable preference, consistent application of that preference
does indeed limit unwarranted disparity.
After considering what makes something a policy judgment,
we can more clearly assess the 100:1 ratio in light of the factors we
have identified. The first factor, regarding principles, is probably
the least helpful, since § 3553(a) can be read as a grab bag of sen
tencing principlef" and thus an effective delegation of authority to
set guiding principles. The 100:1 ratio is more like a subsidiary con
clusion than a basic principle of sentencing. However, the next
three factors-generality, prospectivity, and the nature of the
facts-weigh heavily in favor of treating the 100:1 ratio as a policy
judgment. The 100:1 ratio is, after all, a ratio. It aims to establish a
relationship between two different offenses. This is a broad, cate
gorical judgment that applies prospectively to general classes of ac
tion. Indeed, a policy judgment that establishes the relative degree
of punishment between two offenses is only a short step from the
paradigmatic policy choice of which actions to classify as crimes.
Finally, the factor weighing most heavily in favor of treating
the 100:1 ratio as a policy choice is legislative intent. Critics of the
ratio point out that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory and
thus do not carry the force of law. After Booker, statutory
mandatory minimums are the only formal legislative enactments
constraining judges' abilities to deviate from the 100:1 ratio.1 48 But
although these critics are formally correct, they miss the point. In
light of Booker's standard of review, a sentencing judge's decision
need not violate a statute to nevertheless run afoul of structural
reasonableness. If legislative intent is clear, a judge's decision to
thwart that intent may be unreasonable. Indeed, this is the case
with the 100:1 ratio. Congress has spoken clearly to the policy is
sue, albeit informally. Although the mandatory minimums only set
a limit on the ability of a judge to discard the 100:1 ratio, the mini
mums remain strong evidence of congressional intent. It would be
unreasonable to think that when Congress enshrined the 100:1 ratio
in the mandatory minimum statute it did not also aim for this ratio
to control sentences above and below the minimums. Moreover,
the 100:1 ratio has not resulted from legislative error, ignorance, or
148.

Of course, § 3553(a) is a statutory constraint too, but a rather soft one.
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neglect. Rather, Congress and the Sentencing Commission have
engaged in an ongoing dialogue over the ratio. On multiple occa
sions, Congress has considered and rejected alternative ratios.149
One hopes Congress may yet adopt the Commission's recommen
dations, but until then, it remains difficult to deny that Congress has
made its choice. As a matter of structural reasonableness, judges
should defer to this clear policy choice.
Critics may reasonably worry that the structural approach
leaves them with nothing, and that it comes dangerously close to
running afoul of Booker by making the Guidelines mandatory
again. Yet, this need not be the case. Although structural reasona
bleness requires judges to defer to the P9licy judgments of Con
gress, policy judgments by nature tend to be overinclusive. That is,
their effects tend to reach beyond their intended purposes. Indeed,
this had been a chief argument against the exhaustingly detailed
mandatory Guidelines. 1so Hence, the significance of Booker lies in
the new freedom it gives judges to reject Guidelines policy choices
when the policy does not fit the circumstances of individual cases.
In this sense, judges can finally escape the distant utilitarianism of
policy-setting and the cold regularity of bureaucratic application 151
by focusing on the humane aspect of their sentencing task-under
standing the unique circumstances of the defendant. Judges can
prevent the tyranny of overinclusive policy choices not by imposing
their own rival policy choices, but rather by explaining how a partic
ular defendant engenders individualized reasons-indeed, reasons
based on § 3553(a)-to deviate from the Guidelines in a given case.
As Fourth Circuit Judge M. Blane Michael hinted in his con
curring opinion in United States v. Eura, objections to the 100:1 ra
tio "can be considered insofar as they are refracted through an
individual defendant's case. "152 Judge Michael did not elaborate on
how this process would work, but our own discussion of the argu
ment against the 100:1 ratio points the way. Recall that the best
argument against the 100:1 ratio is not a categorical one based on
the pharmacological nature of crack or on the disparate impact the
ratio entails. Rather, the central problem with the 100:1 ratio is
149. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
150. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 121-24 (discussing "the arbitrari
ness of uniformity").
151. See id. at 103.
152. United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 2006) (Michael, J.,
concurring).
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that it fails to account for individual culpability.153 It measures the
increased harm caused by crack, but it does not account for the
relatively lesser culpability of low-level dealers and users. By over
weighing harm and under-weighing culpability, the 100:1 ratio fre
quently leads to injustice in individual cases and fails to serve the
original intent of the Sentencing Reform Act. Judges can thus
avoid making policy choices and limit the damage caused by the
100:1 ratio by deviating from the Guidelines in cases where the de
fendant is not a major drug trafficker or manufacturer. This indi
vidualized approach is both consistent with structural
reasonableness and effective in reducing the perverse effects of the
100:1 ratio.
C.

Standards of Review

We come finally to the question of how structural reasonable
ness might be effectuated doctrinally. Booker's concept of "reason
ableness" can devolve into an incoherent and inarticulate
incantation, or it can evolve into the raw material out of which
guiding common law presumptions and rules fruitfully spring.
Hence, to become truly reasonable, the concept of "reasonable
ness" must be divided into manageable pieces. The courts have al
ready adopted one such piecemeal rule-the presumption of
reasonableness accorded to within-Guidelines sentences. This is a
sensible beginning, since the presumption-so long as it is rebutta
ble-gives the Guidelines an "anchoring effect"154 without making
them determinative in individual cases (and thus unconstitutionally
mandatory).155 However, the courts have not yet fully elaborated
the standard of review for non-Guidelines sentences.
Some judges have chosen to use the old "abuse of discretion"
standard.1 56 Others have applied something closer to "de novo."157
And still other judges insist that review be for "'unreasonable
153. See supra Part II.A.
154. O'Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity, supra note 109, at 645.
155. I should note that many people disagree with this characterization and worry
that the presumption of reasonableness veers too close to unconstitutional waters. The
full debate over this presumption lies beyond the scope of this Article. However, since
the presumption can be rebutted, I believe that it serves primarily an informational
function, communicating a national norm against which individual judges can make
their own independent assessments.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2006).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2006).
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ness,'" pure and simple. 158 We need not decide the question here
in its entirety, but the notion of structural reasonableness that
emerges from the dispute over the 100:1 ratio helps us make a con
tribution to the effort. In short, we should adopt a two-tiered scru
tiny regime, whereby individualized sentencing decisions are
reviewed deferentially and policy-based decisions are subject to
heightened scrutiny. Appellate courts could police the boundaries
of structural reasonableness by first determining whether a judge's
sentencing decision is individualized or policy-based in nature, and
then applying deference to the former and heightened scrutiny to
the latter.
As explained in this Part, the structural approach has no inten
tion of stamping out individualized substantive sentencing consider
ations; it does not aim to make the Guidelines mandatory. Instead,
it simply asks judges to read § 3553(a) with an individualized gloss,
rather than a categorical policy-focused one. Review for structural
reasonableness fulfills the newfound duty of the appellate courts to
ensure that the system as a whole functions reasonably. Only in
this way can we avoid the "discordant symphony" predicted by
Booker's dissenters. 159
IV.

STRUCTURAL REASONABLENESS IN PRACTICE

Two examples will serve to highlight the difference between
the approach recommended here and the alternative approach
taken by some critics of the 100:1 ratio. The first example comes
from a district court case that exemplifies the former approach. In
United States v. Smith,160 officers responding to a fire caught the
defendant in possession of approximately 70 grams of crack and 650
grams of powder cocaine. 16i After applying the Guidelines and
granting the government's request for a § 5K1.1 departure for sub
stantial assistance, the judge calculated a Guidelines range of forty
one to fifty-one months. 162 Then, the judge made an individualized
assessment of the defendant based on the § 3553(a) factors. She
observed: "Although the offense was serious, no aggravating cir
cumstances were present. Defendant did not appear to have ever
committed or threatened violence or to have sold large quantifies
158. See, e.g., Menyweather, 447 F.3d at 639 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005».
159. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 312 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
161. Id. at 773.
162. Id. at 776.
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[sic] of drugS."163 The defendant had maintained a clean record
during the two years between when the offense occurred and when
the government charged him.164 The judge also found the defen
dant to be "genuinely remorseful."165 But, she observed, "[H]is
guideline offense level was high because he possessed crack co
caine."166 Noting that "the 100:1 ratio actually targets low level
dealers in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the 1986 Act,"167
she concluded that "guideline sentences vary widely based on facts
that have little to do with culpability."168 In the case before her,
however, the individualized need to take culpability into account
demanded that she give an eighteen-month sentence.1 69
Now, compare Smith to Simon v. United States,17o another
crack case also resulting in a below-Guidelines sentence. Agents
conducted a stakeout at the defendant's residence, after which he
fled from the police. l71 In his residence, agents found 600 grams of
crack, forged identification documents, a loaded submachine gun,
$72,000 in cash, and all of the accoutrements of a crack manufactur
ing and dealing operation. In For this major offense, the Guidelines
advised a sentence of 324 to 405 months.173 The judge cited his
belief, and that of the Sentencing Commission, that the 100:1 ratio
exaggerated the harm caused by crackp4 Accordingly, he chose to
apply a 20:1 ratio and impose a 262-month sentence, which would
have been at the top of the resulting Guidelines rangeP5 The
judge's restraint in imposing a sentence at the top of the resulting
range stemmed from his qualms about the disparity that his depar
ture from the 100:1 ratio would necessarily engender. 176 The of
fender's co-defendant, who was guilty of identical criminal conduct
and had the same criminal history, had already been sentenced ac
cording to the 100:1 ratio.177
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 776.
Id.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 782.
Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 44-46.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 48-49.
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Although the judge showed some commendable moderation,
Simon still stands as a useful example of a case in which a deviation
from the 100:1 ratio was not warranted. The defendant was a very
culpable, high-level crack dealer, and there were few compelling in
dividualized reasons to treat him leniently. Likely understanding
this, but wanting to voice his disagreement with the 100:1 ratio, the
judge imposed a lower sentencePS However, since the lower sen
tence was not based on individualized factors, rejecting the 100:1
ratio created clear disparity between the offender and his identical
co-defendant. When the two offenders meet in prison, it remains
hard to imagine that the higher-sentenced co-defendant would feel
that his partner in crime had been sentenced in a way that "pro
mote[ed] respect for the law."179
Smith and Simon represent the two different paths available to
judges confronting the 100:1 ratio in the wake of Booker. Smith
manages to uphold the principles of structural reasonableness while
also limiting the ill effects of the 100:1 ratio. In contrast, Simon
reflects the principles, and problems, of substantive reasonableness
by replacing one kind of disparity with another glaring one. On a
practical level, the former approach also manages to accomplish a
moderate and flexible solution to the decades-old problem of the
100:1 ratio. It allows for the ratio to be abandoned in just those
cases in which it proves the most troublesome. By restraining
judges from making overreaching policy pronouncements, this ap
proach also achieves consistency with the separation of powers and
avoids the backlash that would inevitably result from full-scale judi
cial nullification of Congress's policy choice. Short of congressional
action to amend the ratio, structural reasonableness offers the best
hope of resolving a deeply controversial problem.
Indeed, there is some evidence that judges are already wisely
moving in this direction, quietly and passively softening the blow of
the 100:1 ratio by limiting its impact in individual cases. 1SO Recall
that only thirty-five below-Guidelines sentences so far have been
based on categorical rejection of the 100:1 ratio, but judges have
178. Id. at 49.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006).
180. This phenomenon of "passive resistance" may not be unique to the post
Booker period. One pre-Booker empirical study observed, "[B]eginning in about 1992,
every available indicator suggests that front-line actors in the sentencing system em
ployed their discretion to an ever-increasing degree to lower drug sentence length."
Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of
Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 477, 554 (2002).
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given below-Guidelines sentences in 610 crack cases since Booker,
and they are doing so at a higher rate than in powder cocaine
cases. 181 Most of these 610 sentences have indeed been based on
individualized, rather than policy-focused, sentencing rationales. 182
Undoubtedly, partisan champions of judicial discretion will lament
the thirty-five, and partisan champions of determinate sentencing
will lament all 610. But the rest of us can take comfort in that old
est of practical virtues-moderation.
CONCLUSION: THE SECRET AMBITION OF § 3553(a)
This Article has advanced on three fronts. Conceptually, it has
distinguished between substantive and structural approaches to as
sessing the reasonableness of the 100:1 ratio, and I have argued that
the substantive approach leads to an irresolvable clash of dispari
ties. Only a structural approach can take us beyond this clash.
Doctrinally, I have sought to give content to this structural ap
proach. I sketched the factors that distinguish policy rationales
from individualized rationales, and proposed a standard of review
that gives heightened scrutiny to the former and deference to the
latter. Finally, and practically, we have seen how the structural ap
proach's distinction between policy and individualized rationales
helps achieve a reasonably balanced solution to the crack-powder
controversy.
Criminal law scholar Dan Kahan has argued that public talk of
deterrence, even if frequently based on ill-supported beliefs, has a
useful "cooling effect" on our political discourse. 183 It allows us to
mask the contentious issues of moral condemnation that really mo
tivate our opinions on crime and punishment, while making room
to talk about these issues in a way that mutes controversy and divi
siveness. 184 This, in Kahan's view, is the "secret ambition" of deter
rence.l 85 In the post-Booker milieu, we might also speak in a
similar way of the secret ambition of § 3553(a). Like Kahan's view
of deterrence, a good case can be made that a substantive reading
of § 3553(a) has little value in determining a judge's sentencing de
cision. One judge colorfully described § 3553(a) as "a theoretical
181. See supra Part I.B.
182. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 27, at 82 (listing various rationales that
have been cited by judges imposing below-Guidelines sentences).
183. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
448 (1999).
184. See id. at 476-77.
185. Id. at 435.
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rendition of the supposed attributes of the (mythological) perfect
sentence, a shorthand surrogate for all the arguments about punish
ment that have raged over time without resolution."186 This is
surely true. But more importantly, substantive talk about § 3553(a)
masks and mutes the deepest structural issue left wide open in the
wake of Booker: What balance should we strike between judicial
discretion, appellate oversight, administrative expertise, and legisla
tive control? Debates over the proper interpretation of § 3553(a)
are really debates over how to answer this question.
Like Kahan's deterrence talk, "substantive reasonableness"
discourse can cool some of the deeply felt structural tugs-of-war
that have characterized sentencing law and policy. This may indeed
be an accurate descriptive theory, explaining why much judicial dis
cussion of cocaine sentencing has been preoccupied with disparity
talk. However, there does come a.,time when peaceful ambiguity
must yield to contested clarity. In the wake of Booker, judges can
not avoid the need to engage structurally with sentencing dis
putes-to ask not what particular sentence § 3553(a) requires, but
rather to ask what kinds of decisions § 3553(a) permits. We have
attempted to take a step in that direction. And in doing so, we have
stumbled upon a practical resolution to what has been a very con
tentious issue in sentencing policy. Beyond the clash of disparities,
there is hope.

186.
2006).

United States v. Valencia-Aguirre, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1375 (M.D. Fla.
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